More or Less Ice? Shipping in the Russian Arctic and the Role of Climate Change

1. Introduction

In the international research literature on Arctic shipping, climate change – as evident in the diminishing ice cover – continues to be a dominant factor in many assessments of the commercial potential.¹ With less ice, transports can be conducted over a longer season and with less or no icebreaking assistance, making shipping through the Arctic increasingly realistic. On this basis, many studies have been made on the commercial attraction of Arctic navigation.

In principle, there are three possible Arctic shipping routes, with different features: the North-West Passage (NWP), the Transpolar or Central Route, and the North-East Passage, which includes the Northern Sea Route. Navigating the NWP through the Canadian Arctic archipelagos is impossible for much of the year, due to heavy ice conditions and the accumulation of drifting ice in parts of the passage; moreover, Canada has discouraged use of the passage. However, there is some seasonal traffic. The Transpolar or Central Route, straight across the Arctic Ocean, is not a possibility today because of ice, but is sometimes presented as a future option for when ice melting has proceeded further.²

The focus of discussions of Arctic shipping is on the Northern Sea Route (NSR), the shipping lanes north of Siberia, between the entrance to the Kara Sea and the Bering Strait, see Figure 1. This is a crucial part of the North-East Passage, a looser term which describes the whole passage from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The NSR is an operational sea route area where the changing ice situation is making itself felt most, compared to the two other routes. Russia is claiming authority to administer shipping in this area and has established rules for navigation³, not without some international controversy.⁴ Moreover, Russia’s stated aim is to increase the use of the route.

It is obvious that development of Arctic shipping generally, and the Northern Sea Route specifically, has many drivers, including economic, political and strategic. With Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine since 2022, interaction with western countries has been drastically curtailed, shipping is no exception. Clearly, a comprehensive discussion of the outlook for Arctic shipping must take the new international situation into account.

The objective of this article is, however, narrower. We want to discuss the role that climate change and perceptions of climate change has played in Russian efforts to develop the Northern Sea Route, with a focus on icebreaking, a key element in Russia’s maritime Arctic. We ask:

• How have climate considerations influenced the development of the NSR and Russian NSR policies?
• Are Russian policies consistent and harmonized?
• Are Russian policies informed by climate science?
• Are climate arguments likely to be important in further development of the NSR?

2. Development of the NSR

Development of shipping in the Russian Arctic enjoys high priority in Russia. The systematic use of the Northern Sea Route started in the 1930s, with transports into and out of Dudinka at the mouth of the Yenisey River. This port served the giant metals and metallurgy complex at Norilsk. The use of NSR increased after World War 2, reaching its highest point in the Soviet period in 1987.

In early 1991, the Northern Sea Route was officially opened for international shipping. However, the response of foreign shipping companies was lukewarm – to say the least. Russia did not provide a convincing regulatory and administrative framework; moreover, it was generally felt that the ice situation made regular commercial navigation unpredictable and unsafe. Even within Russia the interest was low, compounded by the weak economy in the 1990s, and traffic plummeted.⁶

2.2 Shifts in focus 2013–2017

A new commercial vision for NSR, to some extent propagated by Atomflot itself due to the icebreaker company’s re-organization which boosted a specific corporate interest in developing customers for icebreakers, took hold around 2010: increased trans-Arctic transit traffic via NSR that would bring revenues to Russia – and finance the icebreaker fleet. With such renewed interest in the NSR, icebreaker construction became urgent. However, it took a long time to decide on construction of a series of three 60-megawatt (MW) icebreakers, capable of breaking 2.9 meters of ice, to replace the existing fleet, although drawings had been ready for years. And by the time the construction of the first of three 60 MW Arktika class icebreakers started in 2013, it had become clear that international transit traffic would not increase as rapidly as anticipated only a few years earlier.¹⁴ By then, the focus had shifted to the icebreaker needs of two major resource extraction projects in the Ob Bay area, Yamal LNG and the Novy Port oil project, which were under development.

Representatives of the gas company Novatek, the majority owner of Yamal LNG, first announced a modest need for icebreaking,¹⁵ mainly confined to keeping a channel open to the port of Sabetta. Given the icebreaking capacity of the new fleet of LNG carriers that had been custom-designed for the project, they did not foresee a need for icebreaking assistance over a longer distance for transports from Sabetta, and they expected it would be possible to go eastwards without icebreaker assistance in the months of July–November when conditions were good.¹⁶ However, Atomflot argued strongly that nuclear icebreakers would also be needed in the open seas: indeed, it saw the escort of LNG carriers as a long-term revenue source.¹⁷ This view was shared by the government, which wanted to secure a revenue base for the icebreaker fleet. Thus, a long-term contract for icebreaker services became part of a package deal which also included subsidized port construction and tax concessions for Yamal LNG.¹⁸

A key component of this contract, which apparently also Novatek found necessary, involved keeping a channel open along the coast of the Yamal Peninsula, see Figure 2. The design of the three new 60 MW icebreakers with flexible draft made them especially suited.¹⁹ Performing this role would keep the renewed icebreaker fleet more or less fully occupied – but the fleet would also be sufficient for that purpose. Construction of the new icebreakers encountered delays, but by the end of 2022, three new 60 MW icebreakers, “Arktika”, “Sibir” and “Ural”, had been delivered.²⁰

3. Sea ice developments in the Arctic – science and perceptions

Roshydromet – The Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring – produces reports with aggregated information on current and expected climate changes in Russia. The assessment reports from Roshydromet are ‘intended for federal and regional authorities who are developing and implementing the country’s climate policy … including planning of concrete measures for development of branches of the economy...’⁴¹ They complement the international assessment reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), specifically incorporating datasets from Russia to account for regional nuances, and are based on peer-reviewed scientific material supplemented by domestic and international assessments.

A core feature in Roshydromet’s reports have been the recognition of climatic changes as anthropogenic, but they have also stressed considerable annual natural variations in temperature. Arctic sea ice conditions are a relatively small, but recurrent, topic in the reports. Key inputs are provided by the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute (AARI), which is the main Russian research organization on sea ice and which is administratively subordinated to Roshydromet. AARI has data on interannual sea ice variations in the Russian Arctic going far back in time. As noted above, unpublished reports from AARI have been cited by Atomflot in support of its predictions of more ice, however in the Roshydromet reports such conclusions are not found.

The first assessment report of 2008 predicted a gradual decrease in ice cover in the Arctic Ocean, but it indicated a higher risk of iceberg occurrences. It argued that this posed challenges for navigation in the Dmitry Laptev, Sannikov, and De Long straits. However, the warming and diminishing ice conditions along the Northern Sea Route were described as progressively favorable.⁴²

The second Roshydromet assessment report from 2014 noted a rapid decline in sea ice extent and thickness: more than 40% on average since the 1980s. It was projected that sea ice in September would vanish by the 2030s. Conditions for navigation were again portrayed as progressively favorable, presenting opportunities for year-round Arctic navigation. However, the 2014 report underscored the necessity of taking into consideration future ice conditions when designing new transport and ice-breaking vessels.⁴³

In the most recent assessment report (2022), average ice thickness at the end of the winter season is noted as having decreased by 40 cm in the period 2004–2018 compared to the previous decade. Ice had almost disappeared in the NSR area in mid-September; it started forming later and melting took place earlier. An increasing shift towards more seasonal, first-year ice, thinner and more prone to melt is documented, with a new normal of lower ice levels.⁴⁴

The report presents models and scenarios developed under the IPCC, indicating a continued loss of sea ice, but also showing major discrepancies concerning the speed of the loss.⁴⁵ Detailed attention is paid to amplified risks from rapidly changing ice conditions along the NSR, including strong winds, diminished visibility and rapid temperature change.⁴⁶ Furthermore, the report underscores the impact of rising sea levels and the increased frequency of intense storms, making bays and ports vulnerable.

The reports paint a consistent picture of melting Arctic sea ice with improved conditions for navigation. But they do not see a reduced need for icebreaking – quite the contrary: in the two first reports this is explained by the likelihood of challenging ice conditions despite diminishing summer ice, but the 2018 report also connects more icebreaking to year-round use of the sea route in the future.⁴⁷ The 2022 report stresses the development and advancement of the icebreaker fleet as a necessity. However, the argument is not based primarily on assessments of developments in the natural environment, but relies instead on expected increased industrial activity in the Arctic: “Therefore, development of the icebreaker fleet is seen as a necessary condition for the functioning of NSR now and in the future”.⁴⁸ To support this claim, Roshydromet refers to articles by the directors of Atomflot.

Incorporating the positions of the potential users of scientific advice as a premise for the very same advice diminishes the scientific value of Roshydromet’s reports. But as input to decision-making in the government, the reports remain very important as representing Russian science. Although the two latest reports include some discussion of the economics of Arctic transit shipping, there is hardly any argument against the continued development of nuclear icebreakers. The 2022 report states that “one of the key questions in the conditions of expected climate changes is the future of the icebreaker fleet. Its development is determined first of all by the economic feasibility of development of the Arctic continental shelf and transportation on the NSR”.⁴⁹ However, the document also cites – on the same page – research arguing that offshore development is ecologically risky and not competitive economically.⁵⁰ It is maintained, though, that both in Russia and abroad an upturn in international transits is regarded as absolutely realistic on the background of further climate change. It cites foreign research indicating that NSR will be competitive with Suez, if bunker prices are lower and icebreaker escort fees cut by 85%.⁵¹ But there is no detailed discussion about assumptions behind such numbers or cost calculations. Indeed, there is no analysis of costs vs. benefits.

4. A new economic situation – more room for climate considerations?

Whereas the start of Russia’s war in Ukraine and the rapid deterioration of relations with the West did not have any immediate effect on official plans and projections, as noted above, new economic realities are likely to be felt soon.

One issue is the capacity of the Russiаn state budget to finance the expansive plans. Developing the NSR, especially building icebreakers, is very costly: in 2022, the price of a new 60 MW icebreaker was given at 41.75 billion rubles (ca. USD 670 million) and the 120 MW ‘Lider’ at 99.14 billion rubles (USD 1.61 billion).⁶⁴ Even with substantial contributions from cargo owners, financing would be a challenge for the Russian state. Although there were no changes in the official, very expansive cargo projections, the tighter budget situation caused by the war in Ukraine was reflected in smaller cuts in the state budget 2024–26 for the construction of icebreakers.⁶⁵ More important, inflationary pressures led to revised cost estimates. Increases between 60 and 100 percent from the contracted price were expected.⁶⁶ The Baltic yard, responsible for construction of the 60MW icebreakers, reported heavy losses in 2023.⁶⁷

In May 2024, it was announced that completion of the ‘super icebreaker’ Lider was postponed – from 2027 to 2030.⁶⁸ But skeptics had already questioned the feasibility of the project, as progress from its start up in 2020 had been very limited.⁶⁹

The more fundamental question is the outlook for Russia’s Arctic economy. It will partly be determined by the longevity and scope of sanctions, but also the general economic and political development inside Russia and Russia’s relations with other states in the aftermath of the war. Uncertainties are likely to hold back commercial investors. The outlook for LNG exports, which were supposed to be the major cargo on the NSR, has become very uncertain and the giant oil project Vostok Oil in East Siberia is seriously delayed. In Russia, the concern voiced publicly is, however, not about investment risks but about lack of ice-strengthened vessels to transport the projected cargo volumes, as well as insufficient capacity to build such ships.⁷⁰ But either way, a revision of plans will be necessary.

In this complicated situation for Russia, compounded by poorer state finances, tougher priorities will have to be made in state policies. Could climate forecasts, and more specifically predictions of sea ice development become more important as a way of optimizing plans for investments in sea route infrastructure and icebreaking? Will the ambition of whole year use – with extensive icebreaking support – be adjusted? An increased role for longer term climate considerations remains pure speculation. The political prestige and symbolic value of developing the sea route in a time of war was reflected in the renaming of the next two icebreakers in line to “Leningrad” and “Stalingrad”.⁷¹ Political and economic constraints are likely to decide Russia’s policy for the NSR. Climate change and climate science will remain of marginal importance.

5. NSR – a climate-friendly alternative?

A new question emerges: will climate policies become an argument in favor of transit shipping via the NSR? After all, a shorter sailing route means less emissions than longer routes. The argument has been put forward in some Russian and international publications.⁷² Novatek is reportedly developing a methodology to show how Arctic transports reduce the climate footprint.⁷³ Atomflot’s mother company, Rosatom, is actively supporting climate measures and presents nuclear power as a major element in the struggle to achieve climate neutrality.⁷⁴ ‘An especially important priority for the Corporation is the climate agenda…’⁷⁵

With thе re-organization of NSR from 2019, Rosatom got responsibility for developing the NSR and attracting traffic. Less ice is a major argument, but the potential climate benefits could also become important. The use of emissions-free nuclear icebreakers and reliance on LNG-fuelеd cargo ships have been the main climate-related arguments thus far, but there are signs that lower global CO₂ emissions will be highlighted: ‘By cutting the distance between Asia and Europe, and by using LNG-fueled vessels, the NSR will significantly reduce emissions compared to current routes around Africa or through Suez.’⁷⁶

However, the exact emissions reduction will depend on several factors. Shipping hydrocarbons and ores from Murmansk through the NSR could shave 19 days off transport times to Kobe (Japan), 18.5 days to Busan (South Korea), and 16 days to Ningbo (China) compared to the Suez route,⁷⁷ – if the average sailing speed is the same on both routes. However, since ships travelling through the NSR do so at a lower speed than on the Suez route, the real timesaving would be less – albeit still significant. Using the shorter NSR between Northern Europe and Asia, a ship can save about 40% of travel time and subsequent fuel and freight shipping costs compared to Suez. Fuel economy can also be achieved by more energy-efficient ‘slow steaming’, whereby a vessel between China and Kirkenes/Murmansk can reduce its speed by 40% and still arrive at the same time as a ship sailing at full speed travelling the Suez route.

Fuel savings translate into reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Russian research indicates that CO₂ emissions per twenty-foot container (TEU) can be reduced by 30–40% percent if NSR is chosen instead of Suez for cargo from North-East Asia.⁷⁸ A report from the Moscow Business School maintained that CO₂ emissions could be cut by 23 percent if NSR was used instead of the Suez Canal.⁷⁹ Goldstein et al. estimated that a 2,550 TEU container ship could reduce CO₂ emissions by between 1,500 and 2,000 tons per sailing using the NSR rather than a southerly route.⁸⁰ The exact energy saving, and thus emission reductions, depend on the choices outlined above, as well as the type of ships.

But to go from a theoretical exercise to actual decisions by ship operators, emissions reductions must be put in a broader context. For potential users of the NSR for shipping between the Pacific and the Atlantic, costs are the overriding issue. Can the NSR offer lower costs than southerly routes?

The choice of sailing route will be determined by many cost factors, such as icebreaker escort vs Suez Canal fees and the practical administration and service level along the route, also reflected in insurance costs. If there is a need to invest in new ice-strengthened vessels, the long-term predictability of conditions will be essential.⁸¹ The reduced number of days at sea allows a ship to make more return trips, resulting in increased revenue and potentially greater profits – but only assuming there is cargo to be delivered. In the final economic analysis, the productivity of the sailings – the proportion of empty containers or unused capacity – must be included. The development of conditions in other sailing routes – improvement or deterioration – will matter as well.

The direct economic value for shipowners of reduced emissions will materialize if, and when, emissions control measures include global maritime transport. CO₂ reductions could conceivably also be included in a market for voluntary carbon offsets. The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) adopted an ambitious strategy on reduction of GHG emissions from ships in 2018, which was strengthened in 2023.⁸² It sets forth targets for voluntary action by the international shipping industry: ‘to reduce CO₂ emissions per transport work, as an average across international shipping, by at least 40% by 2030, compared to 2008’ and to reduce the total annual GHG emissions from international shipping in the same period by at least 20%. The ultimate goal is to reach net-zero emissions around 2050.⁸³

Emissions reductions are likely to be an element in the long-term planning of shipping organizations – in anticipation of future regulations. But the choice of shipping corridor is not the only way to reduce emissions. Fuel choice, slow steaming and measures to increase energy efficiency have already been implemented or considered. And the full climate accounting of Arctic shipping is far from clear. Studies have highlighted the direct negative environmental effects from Arctic shipping – emissions of black carbon and other gases.⁸⁴ Their exact climate effects are contested.⁸⁵ In political terms, their impacts, or perceived impacts, will be deducted from the global CO₂ emission reductions that use of the NSR can offer.

The outlook for Arctic shipping generally, and NSR specifically, is determined by many factors. From the perspective of potential users, the conditions and services offered by Russia are central issues. In the final analysis, however, they must be viewed in conjunction with the commercial calculations of individual prospective users. Such calculations include cargo base, logistics chains, the size of ships suitable for use, and access to markets underway. All these factors must be compared to southerly shipping routes or other transport alternatives.⁸⁶ With Russia’s war in Ukraine and the Western sanctions, a new layer of uncertainty has been added to all activity in the Russian Arctic.⁸⁷ Altogether, it is too early to conclude that emission reductions will be a game-changer in attracting traffic to the NSR.

6. Conclusions – how important is climate change for the NSR?

Climate change has been a key factor in the development of the Northern Sea Route over the last twenty years: first by making regular transit traffic in a prolonged summer season feasible, then by enabling the development of large-scale hydrocarbon extraction projects with maritime logistics, and finally by creating conditions for year-round use of the sea route. Nevertheless, we have concluded that climate change and ice melt specifically has not led to policies tempering expansion of the icebreaker fleet.

Retreating ice cover and thinner ice are not causing improvements in shipping conditions independently. Over the whole period, there has been interaction with significant technological advances increasing the potential for shipping in the Russian Arctic – starting with ice-strengthened cargo vessels serving Nornickel, which could operate without icebreaker support, then by upgrading the icebreaker fleet with new and stronger vessels, and finally by the construction of icebreaking gas carriers. Whereas long-term climate change is a point of reference in many analyses and discussions about the Northern Sea Route, the tangible and more immediate consequences of new ship technologies are most in focus.

Climate change in the Arctic is in Russia widely regarded as advantageous for marine transportation because of receding ice cover and thinner ice, although some negative aspects are recognized, extreme weather, coastal erosion. There are noticeable differences in opinion on how deeply the climate-change impacts will be felt. The most remarkable outlier is the nuclear icebreaker fleet – Atomflot – whose leaders have maintained that the climate is cyclical and that cooling and more ice will soon be the reality. However, according to Atomflot, such developments will not interfere with economic development in the Arctic. The occurrence of more ice can be compensated by the use of stronger and more icebreakers.

Those who expect less ice also arrive at the same operative conclusion: Russia needs more icebreakers, because of increased activity, variable ice conditions and a longer navigation season. Thus, in practical terms, Russian policies are consistent and harmonized, despite differing views on climate change. The main policy driver is increased economic activity in the Russian Arctic, climate change is more of a supplementary issue.

The icebreaker program is understandable from a navigational perspective. More icebreakers obviously improve the conditions for navigation. Little consideration has been given to costs, and also to implications for icebreaking needs of the nuances in the ice situation, geographically and over time. This can partly be explained by the other roles icebreakers are playing, in addition to escorting cargo ships. The icebreakers have a broader purpose as instruments in security policy, escorting naval ships when needed, and enabling Russia to be present anywhere in the Arctic, at any time. They also act as floating support infrastructure to ensure safety of navigation, and assistance to vessel operations if needed. Thus, they can be considered as basic infrastructure. And arguments for such can easily override narrower cost calculations. But of course, costs do not disappear, and at some level trade-offs must be made.

Russian climate science, as represented in the assessment reports from Roshydromet, does not in principle differ from IPCC science: indeed, many Russian scientists have been involved in work under IPCC. What is striking, though, is that the reports go beyond scientific assessment when they address the need for icebreakers, even using Atomflot as a source. One might have expected at least that the reports would have presented a nuanced picture of how much and where icebreaking will be needed, given various development scenarios. Instead, the reports indicate general support for more icebreaking. Thus, it seems that science plays a role in providing background knowledge and understanding of climate change in the Arctic but is not important for concrete policy decisions.

In the context of the mounting international climate crisis, the question of the climate impact of using NSR compared to southerly routes has been raised. Here, we conclude that climate considerations are unlikely to change the calculations of potential users or investors in NSR shipping radically. They may have some effect if and when a mandatory emissions regulation regime includes shipping. But even in such a scenario, a host of other factors affecting risks and costs in Arctic shipping will have to be resolved.

Thus, our overall conclusion is that climate change has played less of a role in the development of shipping in the Russian Arctic than often assumed in the international literature. There are other drivers in Russian policies, and there are other factors that affect decisions by potential international users.

Acknowledgements

The article is a product from the research project Climate change in Russia’s Arctic: Perceptions, response, implications financed by the Research Council of Norway, grant. no. 315401. The authors are grateful for comments from Anna Korppoo, Erdem Lamazhapov, Oleg Anisimov, Michelle Hanssen and two anonymous reviewers, as well as feedback from participants at a presentation at the Arctic Congress in Bodø, May 2024.